


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**Social cohesion in times of forced displacement – the
case of young people in Jordan**

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Social cohesion in times of forced displacement – the case of young people in Jordan

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Abstract

Countries hosting large numbers of refugees often face immense challenges in providing sufficient economic opportunities, and access to basic services. Competition over limited resources can lead to tension and conflict between host and refugee populations. Increases in social tensions have typically been associated with limited social cohesion and inclusion. Jordan is a case in point: with a population of 7.6 million, the country was hosting more than 650,000 Syrian refugees in 2016, most of whom lived in urban areas. To this end, this article explores perceptions of social cohesion among youth (age 18-35) as well as short-term changes over the past two years. Using novel data from an online survey, the article presents evidence of a modest decrease in overall social cohesion in Jordan. At the same time however, young people want to be actors of change and have a clear desire for more civic participation in their communities. Frequently mentioned barriers are a lack of public spaces and limited knowledge regarding possibilities to more actively engage. The results further point to opportunities to strengthen social cohesion between host and refugee youth by supporting joint programs by age and interest, as identities of young people are less driven by nationality, ethnicity or religion, and primarily by age group and interest. While quite encouraging, these findings underscore the importance of further monitoring changes in social cohesion over time.

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II. Abbreviations

GoJ	Government of Jordan
ICT	Information and communication technology
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
RCI	Relational Capability Index
SCI	Social Cohesion Index

1. Introduction

The number of people forcibly displaced due to conflict and human rights violations has reached its highest peak since World War II (UNHCR, 2016b) with 65.3 million individuals in 2015. Around 63% of those displaced are internally displaced persons; the remaining groups comprise refugees and asylum seekers. Most refugees sought refuge in neighboring countries which themselves tend to be economically and socially unstable and already face considerable challenges in providing sufficient economic opportunities and public services to their native populations (e.g. World Bank, 2015). Hosting refugees puts additional strains on already scarce resources which may be a potential source of tension between hosts and refugees (World Bank, 2016). Indeed, several studies find that a lack of economic and social inclusion of different population groups is associated with political and social instability (e.g. Mercy Corps, 2013; World Vision, 2015). In sum, the sustainable integration of refugees in host societies, with the minimum goal of a peaceful coexistence, requires promoting social cohesion - the 'glue' that holds societies together - and inclusive development strategies that should also extend to marginalized local population groups.

Cohesive societies tend to be more resilient against tensions and conflict (OECD, 2011). While there is no uniform definition of social cohesion, concepts of socioeconomic inclusion of different population groups as well as inter- and intra-group trust and solidarity can be considered important theoretical approximations. Relevant components of socioeconomic inclusion and exclusion are context specific in nature; both with respect to space and time. Promoting social cohesion has been a strategic policy goal for several industrial countries (such as Canada, Australia and Denmark) and international organizations since the late 1980s (Ferroni *et al.*, 2008). Today, social cohesion has widely been accepted as an asset for inclusive growth and economic development. It is feared that current flows and levels of displacement, especially under conditions of concurrent economic and social crises in host countries and regions, undermines social cohesion. Promoting social cohesion is seen as a means to counter undesirable societal challenges (Janmaat, 2011; Delhey *et al.*, 2016). Thus, social cohesion can be seen as a desirable end in itself and as a means to foster multidimensional welfare gains.

The aim of this paper is to shed light on the socioeconomic inclusion of Jordanian and refugee youth (age 18-35) in Jordan, and to explore the perception of young people regarding changes in social cohesion since the Syrian crisis began. The case of Jordan is highly relevant in the global displacement crisis, both in terms of absolute numbers and per capita terms, Jordan is among the top refugee hosting countries. With a population of 7.6 million individuals (as of September 2016), the country was hosting more than 650,000 Syrians alone. Around 80% of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon are below the age of 35 years (Verme *et al.*, 2016), which further underscores the relevance of this age group.

At the same time, Jordan's economic growth has been adversely affected by regional instability (e.g. Sweidan, 2016). In effect, unemployment reached 14.8% in the second quarter of 2016, with youth unemployment reaching more than a third young people (World Bank, 2016). The refugee crisis has put a

great strain on public service delivery, including the delivery of education and of health services. An estimated 93% of Syrians are living in mostly urban areas as opposed to refugee camps, with a high concentration in Jordan's poorest and most vulnerable communities (UNHRC, 2016a). Incidences of harassment, discrimination and open violence between host and refugee groups have been increasingly reported, reflecting a weakening of social cohesion (World Bank, 2016; UNHRC, 2016a).

Analyzing the perception of youth regarding social cohesion can provide new insights, and identify entry points on how young people can make meaningful contributions to strengthen cohesion in their communities. While it has been shown that "youth in the Middle East [...] desperately want to fulfil their potential and contribute to their communities", it is less well understood when such contributions are effective (NRC, 2016). Allan *et al.* (2015) have established through anthropological work the notion that civic involvement can help to effectively counter the risk of youth radicalization, as lacking opportunities can lead to a sense of disengagement and frustration, which in turn can – under certain conditions – translate into social unrest.

The contribution to the literature is fourfold: First, we compare different proxies and dimensions of social cohesion in a conflict context. Second, we go well beyond commonly used indicators of group identity (i.e. ethno-linguistic variables) and measure the extent of 'feeling a sense of belonging' to different groups. Third, the instrument identifies the extent to which different barriers to civic commitment affect young people. Fourth, the article discusses potential entry points based on how youth seek to promote social cohesion.

The article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the conceptual framework and provides a literature review related to social cohesion, its role for development, and its role in the context of forced migration. Further, measures of social cohesion are described. Section 3 introduces the context of Jordan in more detail and reviews existing literature on social cohesion and displacement in Jordan. The results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.

2. Conceptual framework and literature review

2.1. Origins and definitions of social cohesion

The concept of social cohesion can be traced back as far as the 15th century to Ibn Khaldun, a renowned Arab historiographer and historian from North Africa. Social cohesion has evolved into a compelling concept within sociology, and social scientists typically use the term in the context of analyzing social relations following large transformations within society. Émile Durkheim, for instance, was concerned with the division of labor and its impacts on social cohesion. He argued that the need of people to interact in order to exchange goods increases interdependencies among members of society, and consequently increases social cohesion. Durkheim further describes how solidarity changes as societal structures become more complex (Norton *et al.*, 2013).

Among economists, a popular concept closely linked to social cohesion is ‘social capital’, which has become popular during the 1990s. While it was originally seen as an individual resource, Robert Putnam extended the idea of social capital to being a beneficial characteristic of societies as a whole. Putnam considered measures of trust, societal norms, and networks as defining variables (Carrasco *et al.*, 2016). Still, the concept of social capital tends to focus on individual benefits of investing in social networks and has been described as narrower version of social cohesion (Carrasco *et al.*, 2016; OECD, 2011; Giraud *et al.*, 2013). Following this notion; while the idea of social capital refers to the accumulation of relational assets as lifetime resources, social cohesion is a more holistic approach that does not solely focus on individual costs and benefits of social interaction, but considers social relationships within societies as an end in itself (Giraud *et al.*, 2013).

Given that both concepts – social cohesion and social capital – lack uniform and clear-cut definitions, yet share some of their defining elements (especially trust), the literature has struggled to clearly identify and differentiate both concepts for empirical investigations. As a result, researchers have developed different measures and proxy indicators, rendering a systematic comparison of empirical findings difficult.

The different definitions for social cohesion proposed by the literature overlap. For the context of this study, a broad, encompassing definition was chosen referring to the solidarity and social harmony exhibited among members of a community that is defined in some geographical terms. A sense of belonging to the respective community, trust, and a system that ensures the inclusion and well-being of all its members, are crucial ingredients for cohesive societies (e.g. Dragolov *et al.*, 2013; OECD, 2011; Ferroni *et al.*, 2008). With societies, rather than specific population groups, being the reference community, this definition further implies some respect for diversity. While some authors focus on social systems, governments, or institutions as actors to foster cohesive societies, others emphasize the perceptions and behavior of individuals towards other members of their community (e.g. Portes *et al.*, 2011; Foa, 2011; Dragolov *et al.*, 2013; Norton *et al.*, 2013). At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that societies - influenced by their beliefs and values - have different understandings of the meaning and means to foster social cohesion, which implies that appropriate measures will at least remain context specific in nature.

2.2. Why should we care about social cohesion?

While solidarity and social harmony should be valued as ends in themselves, it is widely accepted that social cohesion can be an asset for the multi-dimensional wellbeing of societies. Empirical studies reveal that social cohesion indicators can have a positive impact on welfare in terms of economic development and inclusive growth, individual health and happiness, local institutional performance, and adherence to democratic norms.

According to Foa (2011), for instance, there are four channels through which social cohesion can translate into economic payoffs: (1) by reducing transaction costs between members of a society; (2) by facilitating collective action (e.g. fostering cooperation due to shared objectives); (3) by preventing the dis-accumulation of human, physical and intangible capital, and (4) by improving the allocation efficiency of

resources through the socioeconomic inclusion of otherwise marginalized community members (e.g. in labor markets).

Using measures of trust, several studies find that trust positively influences a country's economic development (e.g. Knack *et al.*, 1997; Tabellini, 2005; Knowles *et al.*, 2006). It has also been shown that societies with low levels of trust experience reduced investment rates (Zak *et al.*, 2001). Using a more comprehensive measure of social cohesion and a large sample of cross-country data spanning the period of 1990 to 2012, Foa (2011) finds that social cohesion is positively correlated with economic growth and negatively correlated with the duration and intensity of civil conflict.

Social cohesion can also positively influence the effectiveness of institutions. Putnam (1993), for instance, analyses the effect of socially cohesive communities on the performance of local governments in Italy. He found that regions characterized by an active civil society, i.e. where citizens were engaged in different social or cultural associations to be the ones with the most functional governmental bodies. The associated social and political culture Putnam describes as “horizontal collaboration among equals” (1993, p.103). Easterly *et al.* (2006) argue that politicians need the confidence and trust of their citizens to implement policy reforms, which is more often found among inclusive communities. Communities that are economically and socially disintegrated (e.g. along ethnic lines) put significant constraints on the scope of policy action undermining institutional strength, which in turn negatively affects economic performance. This is also supported by LaPorta *et al.* (1997) who find a positive association between trust and government performance.

There is also some evidence that individuals living in cohesive societies are on average living longer, and are mentally and physically healthier (e.g. Kawachi *et al.*, 1997; Bjornstrom *et al.*, 2014; Hong *et al.*, 2014; Kim *et al.*, 2013). Delhey *et al.* (2016) further find that European citizens living in societies with higher values of social cohesion are happier.

2.3. Social cohesion and forced migration

“Those who lost everything are hosted by those who already have little ...”
UNDP, 2014, p. 8

How does the arrival of forcibly displaced people affect social cohesion in receiving communities? There is very little empirical evidence on this question, especially in the context of developing countries. Drawing from empirical studies investigating the effects of poverty, inequality, and diversity on different measures of social cohesion however, provides some insights to build on for future research.

In 2015, an estimated 21.3 million individuals worldwide were refugees, i.e. crossed national borders in search of safety, another 3.2 million were seeking asylum without having their claims resolved (UNHCR, 2016a). The brunt of this global refugee crisis is borne by relatively few countries that are mostly economically vulnerable: 86% of refugees registered with UNHCR are hosted in developing regions, of

which 26% by least developed countries (Ibid). These countries are already struggling to provide sufficient economic opportunities and access to basic services to their citizens (UNHCR, 2016a).

For the purposes of this article, we adopt UNHCR's (e.g. 2016a) definition of forced displacement as resulting from "persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations". Many forced migrants are facing specific displacement-related needs. Not only do they often experience economic hardship before fleeing their country, but in addition many have to leave their homes unprepared, and are forced to abandon their property and non-portable assets (Verme *et al.*, 2016). Many have seen and experienced horrific and traumatic situations both prior to as well as during their displacement. Living conditions in refugee camps and settlements are harsh and generally inferior to their pre-displacement situation (Ibid).

The arrival of forced migrants influences the socio-economic structure of host communities. Poverty, resource scarcity and a lack of institutional capacities in hosting developing countries to react to changing demands in an efficient and flexible manner puts immense pressure on host and refugee groups alike. Empirical evidence from analyzing inequalities across Europe shows that economic vulnerability has adverse effects on measures of social cohesion (Vergolini, 2011). Individuals experiencing economic hardship show lower levels of social cohesion¹ than those not facing these difficulties. These findings echo Sen's *capability approach* (1992): Poverty can limit a person's capabilities to actively take part in society, which can lead to social exclusion and reduce social cohesion (Vergolini, 2011).

Many forced migrants have experienced traumatic situations. Using data from the US, Alesina *et al.* (2002) show that recently experienced traumatic situations decrease the level of trust in others. Also, groups that have experienced discrimination or have formed minorities have significantly lower levels of generalized trust. The latter finding is relevant since minorities and people traditionally discriminated against may be at a greater risk of being displaced in civil conflicts compared to majority groups.

A rise in the number of economically vulnerable individuals in a community may increase levels of income disparity. It seems reasonable assuming that widening income gaps within a society in turn damage the social fabric between its members. This is further exacerbated by the extent to which already scarce labor market opportunities are further deteriorating. Kawachi *et al.* (1997), for instance, find that income inequality negatively affects measures of trust and civic participation in a community. This is supported by other studies and some even argue that it is one of the main variables explaining low levels of generalized trust (e.g. Alesina *et al.*, 2000; Costa *et al.*, 2003; Gerritsen *et al.*, 2010; Delhey *et al.*, 2005; Putnam, 2007).

Forced migration leads to an increase in diversity in terms of ethnicity, language, religion, race etc. among receiving societies. Diversity can induce positive as well as negative effects on a society. Differences between people are often associated with conflicting preferences over resource allocations which, in the

¹ In terms of composite indices build on (1) confidence in the social benefit system; (2) perceived intergroup tensions; (3) perceived quality of public services; (4) and measures of alienation

extreme, can lead to or fuel political and civil unrest, difficulty in providing public goods, and exclusion of minorities. At the same time, diversity is associated with a varied set of abilities and experiences that is often connected to encouraging innovation and creativity leading to enhanced productivity (e.g. Alesina *et al.*, 2005; van Staveren *et al.*, 2017; Kanbur *et al.*, 2011; Miguel *et al.*, 2005). Rapid displacement-related population shifts can affect diversity which in turn is likely to trigger additional dynamics, since group memberships and group boundaries are not well defined (e.g. Who belongs to the local society? What are different groups of displaced?) and are subject to change (e.g. following different ‘waves’ of displaced groups reaching host societies). Drawing from a range of disciplines, potential effects of increased diversity can be described as follows: According to the *social psychological belief congruence theory*, people tend to interact with others that have a similar belief system (Gerritsen *et al.*, 2010). Strong ties among group members who share similar salient characteristics can create an in-group bias and simultaneously enforce out-group hostility. According to the *intergroup threat theory* diversity might enhance in-group solidarity, which can often cause out-group distrust, especially in times of danger and insecurity (Stephan *et al.*, 2009). The theory distinguishes between ‘realistic threats’ (e.g. to the economic welfare of the group) and ‘symbolic threats’ (e.g. to group’s values and belief system). While the theory primarily deals with perceptions of threat, the latter nevertheless oftentimes have real consequences regardless of whether the assessment of threat by the group or individual is accurate. In an empirical set-up with artificially assigned group membership, Hargreaves *et al.* (2009) investigate the link between a person’s attachment to a group and individual as well as aggregate welfare. The authors find that group membership is associated with a difference in trust between insiders and outsiders. Rather than through positive discrimination in favor for insiders, the effect is driven by negative discrimination against outsiders reducing aggregate levels of trust. *Contact theory* suggests that increasing the number of minority groups may foster the possibility of social interactions between majority groups and out-group individuals. Such interactions in turn can decrease prejudices and negative evaluations of the out-group. This is supported by evidence from Wagner *et al.* (2006) in the context of German migrants. Schlueter *et al.* (2010) show that both competing theories; *contact* and *threat theory* apply in the context of increased immigration in the Netherlands.

Several empirical studies have investigated the link between diversity and social cohesion or social capital. Relying mainly on measures of trust, they mostly find that generalized trust is lower in more diverse societies (e.g. Alesina *et al.* 2002; Putnam, 2007; Stolle *et al.*, 2008; Delhey *et al.*, 2005). In his analysis of ethnic diversity and community dynamics, Putnam (2007) differentiates between short run and long run effects. He argues and provides empirical evidence for the US that diversity tends to reduce solidarity and social capital in the short run, while “successful immigrant societies” manage to overcome ethnic fragmentation and create societal benefits in the long run. In the short run, individuals living in ethnically diverse societies may experience or opt for personal isolation associated with lower levels of solidarity. In this sense, diversity can reduce both in-group and out-group solidarity, which Putnam (2007) refers to as *constrict theory*. Other research finds less civic engagement in more heterogeneous societies (e.g. Costa *et al.*, 2003). A formal theoretical model describing the interaction of heterogeneous groups and their participation in society has been proposed by Alesina *et al.* (2000). The authors assume that individuals

prefer to interact with each other if they share similar characteristics such as income levels, race or ethnicity. Assuming that such characteristics overlap with individual preferences and interests, this is “equivalent to saying that individuals prefer to join groups of individuals with preferences, similar to their own” (Ibid, p. 850). While the model does not a priori suggest whether societal heterogeneity increases or decreases civic participation, it explores conditions under which heterogeneity is expected to lead to one or the other outcome. Using panel data from the US stretching from the mid-1970s to mid-1990s, they find organizational membership to be lower in more racially and ethnically diverse and economically unequal communities. In an experimental setup, Glaeser *et al.* (2000) find measures of trustworthiness to be lower in two-person games if respondents are paired with somebody of a different race or nationality.

In contrast to these findings, several neighborhood studies conducted in developed and developing countries do not fully support the hypothesis that greater ethnic diversity increases distrust (e.g. Tolsma *et al.*, 2009; Letki, 2008). In these studies, once controlling for neighborhood deprivation and its relationship with the ethnic composition, the effect of ethnic diversity on measures of social capital tends to be starkly limited. Hence, it may be socioeconomic deprivation rather than ethnic diversity that directly and more strongly erodes community social cohesion. Several studies support this hypothesis (e.g. Oliver *et al.*, 2000; Ross *et al.*, 2001; Gesthuizen *et al.*, 2009). Using cross-country data from developing countries over the period of 1990-2010, Staveren *et al.* (2017) find that it is social exclusion – in terms of the way different groups and their members relate to and interact with each other – rather than ethnic diversity as such that has a negative effect on social cohesion. While Stolle *et al.* (2008) provide evidence for lower levels of trust in more heterogeneous neighborhoods in US and Canadian samples from 2003, and 2005 respectively, they explore the importance of social interaction: The authors propose that the negative effect of diversity on trust is mediated through the regularity of personal interaction. This is consistent with contact theory.

In sum, the empirical and theoretical evidence on the negative effect of ethnic diversity on social cohesion is contested. A substantial number of studies suggest rather, that it is high inequality, a lack of interaction and social ties, and the relative unfamiliarity among ethnic groups that decreases measures of social cohesion (Portes *et al.*, 2011). Since familiarity with one’s neighbors, fellow citizens, as well as the scale and intensity of interactions are dynamic, we are also reminded to consider time dimensions when thinking about social cohesion or a lack thereof; something, which is scarcely explored in existing studies. It is also important to note that poverty and low socio-economic status can negatively influence the ability and willingness to actively participate in society and build social ties and trust within the community. Disadvantaged communities are thus particularly at risk of reduced social cohesion in the face of increased diversity. The effects implicit in the contact theory could then be overridden by the threat perceived (e.g. Branton *et al.*, 2005; Li *et al.*, 2003; Hooghe *et al.*, 2009).

Diversity and social cohesion are both multidimensional concepts lacking a uniform definition and measurement. Yet, measurement decisions for both concepts play a key role for identifying effects and for determining the internal and external validity of the findings, i.e. for determining how much we can learn from a given case study. Different aspects of diversity can be measured through a range of variables

including race, ethnicity, language, income, education, income levels, and religion. Studies using US data usually define diversity through ‘race’. Other studies have differentiated ethnic groups through ethno-linguistic fractionalization indices. Fedderke *et al.* (2008) provide evidence that groups might be formed by conscious choice rather than based on salient, mostly static characteristics such as linguistic or ethnic roots. Analyzing the case of South Africa over the period of 1911 to 2001, the authors establish that group identities are not stable over time. Furthermore, different forms of heterogeneity might have different effects on social cohesion. For the case of Australia, Leigh (2006) argues that it is linguistic diversity rather than ethnic diversity explaining various levels of neighborhood trust. Lancee *et al.* (2011) go beyond ethnic diversity to investigate the effect of different forms of diversity on the quality of neighborhood contacts and inter-ethnic trust in the Netherlands. The authors indeed show that different types of diversity explain the variance in neighborhood trust and, notably, that diversity itself is interpreted differently by immigrants and natives. Ethnic diversity reduces the quality of contact with neighbors but not general inter-group trust. Among the native population, trust is reduced with increasing religious diversity in the neighborhood. Studies have found conflicting evidence regarding the effect of religious differences on trust (e.g. Alesina *et al.*, 2002; Lancee *et al.* 2011). While there is no clear indication in the literature on how different types of diversity relate to the concept of social cohesion, it can be concluded that relevant dimensions go beyond the ethnic composition of communities and are highly context specific.

The above-mentioned studies mainly use data from industrialized countries. There is very limited empirical evidence on the relationship between diversity and social cohesion in less developed societies. Even less research has been conducted on the effects of *forced migration* on social cohesion. Forced migration does not necessarily increase diversity in communities. Most refugees seek protection in neighboring countries, e.g. in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In these situations, refugees often share language, religion, and outer-appearances with the native population, especially in regions in which tribal ties stretch across national borders. The latter holds, for example, in the northern region of Jordan near the border with Syria (Mercy Corps, 2013). Owing to the circumstances of forced displacement, other dynamics observed in case of ‘regular’ migration movements are likely to be different, too. Hence, it is difficult to draw general conclusions regarding the effect of forced migration on social cohesion from current research. It is highly context specific, influenced by the socio-economic situation of receiving communities but also by their cultural distance to the refugee population. Not all migration patterns are perceived as equally threatening by host populations.

2.4. Operationalizing social cohesion

Given the multi-dimensional and context specific nature of social cohesion, and the lack of a clear-cut definition across disciplines, there is no best practice in measuring social cohesion. As described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, common proxies used include generalized levels of trust, membership in associations or civic engagement. Most studies, however, solely rely on measures of trust. While trust can be considered an important proxy of social cohesion, it only measures one component of a complex concept.

In addition, Sturgis *et al.* (2010) establish that the specific definition of trust chosen can lead to very different results. Further, the respective reference frame is not uniformly defined. Some studies rely on neighborhoods, while others use larger communities or entire societies as a regional reference. At the same time, even though social cohesion is a group phenomenon, most measures focus on individual perceptions (Norton *et al.*, 2013). One can argue that this acknowledges the role of individuals as active agents in shaping cohesive groups, yet aggregating individual perceptions to a meaningful *community* or *societal* level is not straightforward.

One useful way to conceptualize social cohesion is across three different types of relationships:

1. **Relationships within groups of a society** (referred to as *bonding*), which are built around homogeneity.
2. **Relationships across groups within a society** (referred to as *bridging*) where common interests or goals transcend different groups within a society.
3. **Relationship between individuals and state institutions** (referred to as *linking*).

Bridging and bonding both describe *horizontal relationships* across members of a society, *linking* can be considered as vertical relationships (World Vision, 2015).

Data that has been used to construct multi-dimensional social cohesion indices come from secondary multi-purpose surveys such as the Afro- and Arab-barometer, the World Value Survey or the Gallup World Poll. There are several advantages of using these surveys, which include their national representativeness and repeated cross-national data collection. This allows comparing results across space and time (e.g. Foa, 2011; Giraud *et al.*, 2014). Based on a review of existing studies and measures, two social cohesion indices were selected to form the theoretical foundation for the survey instrument developed for this study (see Appendix **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**). While most of the reviewed measures overlap in several dimensions, the selection of indices was based on their overall rigor and theoretical foundation. Special attention was paid to the applicability of the measure to the study's context.

2.4.1. The Relational Capability Index (RCI)

The Relational Capability Index (RCI), developed by Giraud *et al.* (2013), is a multi-dimensional index based on theories of relational anthropology. The index focuses on the “quality of relationships among people and on their level of relational empowerment” (Giraud *et al.*, 2013, p. 2). The index is theoretically well founded and relies on Bernard (1999) who includes economic, political, and socio-cultural relationships in his definition of social cohesion. These relationships can be passive or active in nature. The index also builds on Sen's and Nussbaum's work on the *capability approach* and includes three dimensions of inclusion or exclusion of an individual within a society:

1. **Integration into networks** (referring to *socio-economic integration*),
2. **Private relations** (referring to *socio-cultural integration*), and

3. Civic commitments (referring to *civic and political integration*).

Referring to the previous classification of relationship types (see Section 2.4), while bonding and bridging activities can fall into all three dimensions, linking activities are expected to be found in the context of civic commitments.


As far as variables to proxy the different dimensions are concerned, Giraud *et al.* (2013) measure socio-economic inclusion/exclusion in terms of an individual's employment status, and their access to transport, telecommunication, and access to information. Private relations are measured by the household size, the closeness of family ties, the existence of close friends and their emotional as well as financial support in case of need, and the general trust in people known to the individual. Indicators measuring the civic commitments include participation in collective actions, voting behavior, performed solidarity, and the general trust in people unknown to the individual.

Note that the index – within the framework of the capability approach - is based on capabilities rather than functionings. It is thus acknowledged that there are several ways for individuals to exercise agency and achieve functionings that can depend, for instance, on their cultural background and personal preferences. The authors also propose different ways to construct an aggregate social cohesion index, which will not be done in this article since we are interested in looking at the different components.

2.4.2. The Social Cohesion Index (SCI)

The Social Cohesion Index (SCI) was developed by Langer *et al.* (2016) and draws upon theoretical considerations from various disciplines. It focuses on three types of relationships: (1) **Relationships among individuals of the same group**, (2) **Relationships among individuals across groups**, and (3) **Relationships between individuals, groups and the state** (Langer *et al.*, 2016). Hence, it specifically considers the dimensions of bridging, bonding, and linking introduced earlier (see Section 2.4). These relationships are operationalized by considering three critical components: **inequality**, **trust**, and **group identities** that are not independent but rather influence each other (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Social Cohesion Triangle



Source: Langer *et al.* (2016)

The first component includes indicators measuring the extent of **perceived inequality** compared to other citizens (*vertical inequalities*), and between groups (*horizontal inequalities*). Inequalities here include political, cultural, social, as well as economic inequality. The authors argue that perceived inequalities in any of these dimensions can foster political conflict and can lead to violence, particularly if they manifest themselves as horizontal inequalities.

Indicators for the component of **trust** refer to trust in institutions, trust in relatives, and in other groups. Many scholars have shown that trust is a crucial part responsible for binding people together within a society (e.g. Knack *et al.*, 1997; Zak *et al.*, 2001). Note that the relationship between trust and conflict likely runs in both directions: trust within a society and in state institutions is expected to build resilience towards conflicts, and conflicts are expected to destroy trust (Langer *et al.*, 2016).

The third component of social cohesion is proposed by the authors to be measured by the strength of people's adherence to their **national** and their **group identity**. It is based upon the relative preference of people towards either their nationality or their group identity, e.g. towards their ethnicity. The authors argue that adherence to identity is an important indicator for conflict potential across groups, for instance, in multi-ethnic societies if ethnic identities are stronger than national identities. National identities might also be used to differentiate oneself from other national identities, e.g. from immigrant populations. In this case, adherence to national identities can undermine social cohesion across host and immigrant groups. In any case, the proposed concept of national vs. ethnic identities is only applicable to multi-ethnic societies. The authors apply the index to several African countries and acknowledge that the choice of group variables should depend on the relevant categories in the respective society. For the case of Jordan, this article focuses on different nationalities and adds other group dimensions as well (see Appendix 1a).

Langer *et al.* (2016) develop a national index of social cohesion (SCI) based on the three components described. The SCI is solely based on individual perceptions and does not include 'objective' measures, e.g. related to inequalities. The authors argue that social cohesion is the result of these perceptions, even though they believe them to be closely correlated with more objective indicators. Consistent with this argument, Justino *et al.* (2016) show that distributive beliefs rather than objective levels of inequality have driven recent civil protests in Latin American countries. The authors point to other research showing that distributive beliefs, particularly perceived inequality, is strongly associated with preferences in favor for redistribution.

To account for general differences in perceptions across groups, Langer *et al.* (2016) separately estimate the social cohesion index for different groups in society. The national social cohesion index can then be adjusted by a coefficient of variation across subgroup within the country, which results in the Variance-Adjusted Social Cohesion Index.

3. Forced migration and social cohesion in Jordan

Jordan has been a major migrant and refugee hosting country as well as a sending country for labor migrants for decades.² According to a population census conducted in 2015, around 30% of Jordan's population were foreign nationals (De Bel-Air, 2016). Palestinian refugees have played an influential role in Jordan's nation building since their arrival in 1948. In 2016, 2.1 million individuals of Palestinian descent were registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA). Many Palestinian refugees are naturalized³ and thus were partly considered as returnees, e.g. when they were displaced from/ returning from Gulf War countries in the early 1990s. The second, and the third Gulf War in 2003 also led to the arrival of "several hundred thousand" refugees from Iraq (Ibid, p. 2).

Jordan has once again been facing a large and rapidly increasing numbers of arriving refugees as a result of the ongoing Syrian (e.g. Mottaghi, 2016). In 2015, Jordan was estimated to host around 1.4 million Syrians, out of which around 650,000 were registered as refugees (GoJ, 2015). It is this recent displacement crisis that will be the focus of the remainder of this article.

Most Syrian refugees originate from relatively disadvantaged and destitute areas and have sought refuge in informal settlements in relatively poorer areas of Jordan close to the border, particularly in in three northern governorates: Al-Mafraq, Irbid and the outskirts of Amman (Verme *et al.*, 2016). Syrian refugees in Jordan are systematically different both from the average pre-crisis population in Syria as well as from the average population in Jordan; inter alia, there is a higher proportion of female-headed households, and refugees tend to be younger and less educated. Syrian refugees have limited possibilities to obtain even informal employment and hence, face immense economic and social hardship. Using the UNHCR poverty line, almost 70% of the Syrian refugees in Jordan are estimated to be poor. This number increases to 87% if the national poverty lines are adopted. Furthermore, they are considered highly vulnerable to monetary and food poverty. Their access to basic state services is restrained as the Jordanian government has difficulties meeting the increased demand (Ibid).

The patterns of forced migration described above have starkly influenced the socio-economic structure of the society. While most Syrian refugees are Muslims and of ethnic Arab decent (Verme *et al.*, 2016), thus sharing their religion and ethnicity with most Jordanian citizens, the arrival of Syrian refugees is still expected to have increased the socio-economic diversity within the population. In 2014, three years after Jordan experienced the first substantial increase in the number of Syrian refugees, an estimated 77% of Syrian refugees had a largely positive impression of the Jordanian population while only 34% of host

² Jordan has also produced refugees and internally displaced, for instance, in the course of the Six-Day War in 1967. Labour emigration, mostly to oil producing Arab counties started in the 1950s and peaked in the 1970s. (De Bel-Air, 2016).

³ The Census in 2015 registered around 635.000 Palestinian nationals in Jordan (De Bel-Air, 2016). The gap between these figures should include naturalized Palestinians.

community members had a positive impression of Syrian refugees. Additionally, 18% of Syrians reported difficulties integrating into their host communities (REACH, 2014a). Promoting social cohesion has become part of Jordan's policies as evidenced by its inclusion in the National Resilience Plan 2014-2016 and Jordan's Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2015. In fact, it is assumed that a lack of social cohesion in Jordanian host communities has contributed to increased tensions that negatively affect the country's development and could easily culminate into outbreaks of violence (REACH, 2014a; GoJ, 2015).

The remainder of this Section summarizes current trends relevant for social cohesion in Jordan and is informed by recent policy reports based on expert interviews, focus group discussion, and limited survey evidence. Most reports draw upon the situation in Northern governorates – the regions hosting the largest numbers of Syrian refugees.

3.1. Sources of tension in Jordan

Increasing tensions between Jordanian host communities and Syrian refugees were reported as early as 2012 (Mercy Corps, 2012 & 2013). In 2014, in a quantitative survey of over 6,000 households in the Northern governorates, three quarters of Jordanian respondents reported that increases in water shortages, waste accumulation, living costs, and competition over jobs have led to tensions in their local communities (REACH, 2015). It is important to note, however, that various sources of tensions already existed before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the associated increase in refugee numbers. Jordan was already facing elevated levels of youth unemployment and low levels of labor productivity, inadequate access to basic public services in many parts of the country, and high levels of poverty (World Vision, 2015; De Bel-Air, 2016). The rapid arrival of refugees exacerbated existing structural problems.

In the policy reports published since 2011, three broad sources of tension keep re-emerging.

1. **Tensions over resources and basic services** (particularly water and affordable housing)
2. **Competition over jobs**
3. **Aid community targeting**

While several sources of tension arise through direct competition between refugees and host communities (*horizontal tensions*, e.g. competition over jobs and housing), tensions are also evoked by interactions with local governance institutions (*vertical tensions*, e.g. access to public services, aid allocation) (e.g. World Vision, 2015; De Bel-Air, 2016; REACH, 2015).

In 2015, there was an estimated shortage of around 120,000 housing units for Syrian refugees alone and housing prices rose by 100% to 200% compared to pre-2011 levels. This affects both refugees and Jordanians. On average, refugees were estimated to spend almost half of their income on rent, while Jordanians only spent 3% since most own their homes. Those who rent their dwellings are concentrated in urban areas (REACH, 2015). Mercy Corps (2013) describes cases of landlords evicting Jordanians to rent out to Syrians whom they charge a multiple of the former rent.

Water shortages have been a common phenomenon in Jordan well before 2011. The increased demand for water has reduced the amount of water per capita, which has fueled tensions and discontent (Mercy Corps, 2013; REACH, 2015). Water shortages also pose hygiene and health risks for the population (REACH, 2015). In addition, municipalities struggle to manage increased amounts of waste and sewerage (UNDP, 2014). Infrequent garbage collection and an increased prevalence of pests are among the consequences and result in further health risk (REACH, 2015). Another segment of public services that was already overburdened prior to the Syrian crisis and is even more so now is the health sector (Mercy Corps, 2013; UNDP, 2014). The spread of new diseases has been linked to insufficient access to WASH facilities, insufficient solid waste management and overcrowded schools (REACH, 2014a).

Regarding the educational system, schools have adopted double-shifts to accommodate refugee children. Many classrooms, however, remain overcrowded, teachers are often not compensated for their additional work, and the overall quality of education is reported to be deteriorating (Mercy Corps, 2013; UNDP, 2014). Verme *et al.* (2016) estimate that only around half of Syrian refugee children in Jordan attend school. In displacement crises, promoting adequate access to education systems is an important protection strategy, especially if the demographic composition of refugees includes a large share of young individuals. Displacement usually interrupts human capital formation repeatedly and for a long time but schools have the potential to provide a safe space and contribute to creating positive prospects for children and adolescents.⁴ By bringing together children and adolescents from various backgrounds, educational facilities also have a role to play in fostering social cohesion. In contrast to these theoretical merits, schools in Jordan are reported to be among the places where social tensions erupt. This has largely been attributed to the overburdening of schools and has led to discussions of a segregation of Jordanian and Syrian children (UNDP, 2014; REACH, 2014a). Economic opportunities, already limited before the onset of the crisis, worsened over the past years with the narrative being a reciprocal scapegoating: Many Syrian workers feel exploited by employers, while Jordanian workers blame refugees for losing their jobs (Mercy Corps, 2013). According to a survey by REACH (2015), more than 80% of respondents stated that the increase in job competition has led to tensions within their communities. Despite the joint efforts of the Jordanian government and of international stakeholders, ambitious initiatives such as the 2016 Jordan Compact ‘Turning the Syrian crisis into a development opportunity’ have had limited impacts on the economy due to complex and equivocal implementation and policy effects (Lenner & Turner, 2017). The resulting frictions are mainly due to the shortcomings of a zonal development model, a nationally segmented labor market, the relevance of informal labor, and a political creation of informality (Ibid).

Another factor leading to frictions between refugees and host communities is the aid allocation by international and national organizations. Both host and refugee groups often perceive the allocation as unfair and accuse aid agencies of corruption. It is indeed problematic that -as of 2013- the majority of

⁴ It is important to note, however, that monetary returns to education are often low due to a lack of employment opportunities (e.g. Verme *et al.*, 2016)

organizations had exclusively focused on Syrian refugees while poor Jordanians have been excluded from these services (Mercy Corps, 2013 & 2012). In a survey conducted by REACH (2014b) in northern governorates, almost 70% of respondents who received aid reported that aid, in addition to positive effects, also had negative effects on their local communities. More than 80% of these respondents then stated that it has led to an increase of tensions. A broader needs-based approach was strongly called for. In addition, insufficient communication between citizens and local administrative and government bodies regarding the provision of public services, for instance, has been associated with vertical tensions and was identified as another broad challenge for social cohesion (e.g. REACH 2014a & 2015)

Tensions around the issues described above are feared to lead to a tipping point where they devolve into open physical violence between groups (World Vision, 2015). The initial hospitality of Jordanian host communities has been reported to decrease as they are themselves confronted with persistent hardship (Mercy Corps, 2012 & 2013). Resentment is rising and there are voices demanding more segregation between host and refugee communities, advocating restrictions e.g. on the movement of the Syrian population through curfews. Rising resentment and tensions can lead to vicious cycles: refugee families may become more isolated making it even more difficult to support social cohesion between hosts and refugees. Isolation especially affects women and their children: first, as a coping strategy to avoid harassment, they are more likely to isolate, and second they are more endangered if the security situation deteriorates (World Vision, 2015). Isolation is particularly likely where recreational and social spaces for the society to meet are lacking (Mercy Corps, 2013). Increased scapegoating may lead to more discrimination that again is followed by a withdrawal from social life, which can negatively affect several aspects of people's lives, including restricting their employment opportunities.

3.2. Mediating factors

There are several factors that serve as sources of stability and resilience in host communities. In a comparative case study, Mercy Corps (2013) analyzed host community and refugee tensions in the north of Jordan based on focus group discussions and a mapping of tensions. The results are summarized in what follows:

“Relations between the border regions of Jordan and Syria have traditionally been strong and deeply connected by family and economic ties.” (Mercy Corps, 2013, p. 21) Pre-crisis relations across the border positively influence social cohesion among refugees and host communities. In particular, extended family ties, similar tribal identities, or previous business and trade relations are factors found to be associated with less social tensions and with fostering an atmosphere of mutual support and assistance. Syrian refugees were less often scapegoated for problems faced within local communities (Ibid).

The demographic structure of the refugee population is another factor influencing social tensions. Regions with a refugee population consisting mainly of widows and single mothers with their young children were reported to be less prone to tensions and violence. Unemployed young men, however, have more often

been actively involved in incidents of violence and are hence seen as a destabilizing factor for many communities (Ibid).

Some Jordanian media outlets have also reported to have become a destabilizing factor by having adopted an increasingly negative and hostile language towards Syrian refugees. In particular, media outlets were reported to fuel negative perceptions between host and refugee communities and to politicize the presence of Syrian refugees by questioning the Jordanian government's policy towards the Syrian conflict (Ibid).

3.3. Social cohesion and the youth in Jordan

“Faced with multiple restrictions in all areas of their lives, both refugee youth and those from host communities often feel a sense of despondency and disengagement.”
NRC, 2016, p. 5

The OECD (2016) reports that 70% of the Jordanian population is below the age of 30. The youth in Jordan – both Jordanians and refugees - are currently facing a period characterized by a lack of educational and economic opportunities. These conditions can lead to feelings of hopelessness toward the future as well as feelings of exclusion or withdrawal from the community, particularly during adolescence. This often translates into frustration which can lead to social unrest and an increased propensity for violence (Nelson *et al.*, 2015). To put it differently, while the young do want to be actors of change in society, there is currently a great danger of creating lost generations (NRC, 2016)

Tensions between young men are a growing concern (Mercy Corps, 2012). A study on the youth in Lebanon affected by the Syrian crisis involving quantitative and qualitative research methods confirms that the lack of employment opportunities negatively affects their psychosocial health. Further, the youth is reported to feel under “extra pressure, especially female youth, to abide by traditional norms and roles, to marry early and be confined within the home” (Al-Masri *et al.*, 2014, p. 3). Note that, in addition to displacement- or development-related needs, young women often face gender-based challenges, too (OECD, 2016). Early marriages among women, domestic violence and child labor can be considered as manifestations of social tensions (World Vision, 2015).

Among the coping strategies sought to enlarge economic opportunities, NRC (2016) reports that many of the youth seek onwards travel or emigration to Europe, despite this being an expensive and dangerous journey with very unpredictable and insecure outcomes in terms of economic and social opportunities.

4. Results

The following section presents the results of an online survey that was conducted between January and March 2017. The sample consists of 444 individual questionnaire responses collected through a social media survey (Facebook campaign) and an email campaign. Details related to (1) the survey instrument


developed and (2) the process of data collection can be found in the Survey Data Collection Report (see Appendix 1). The survey instrument itself can be found in Appendix 3.

4.1. Sample characteristics

The sample characteristics confirm that demographic characteristics of respondents differ across the email and Facebook campaigns. The average age of respondents across both samples is 25. Among the Facebook campaign, the age distribution is fairly spread out across the full target group, which we interpret as the advertisement successfully reaching the target audience. Respondents of the email campaign are significantly younger, which reflects targeting them through university networks (Figure 2 and Appendix 1 for the sampling strategy).


Differences in the location of respondents (see Figure 4 and Figure 5) are consistent with prior expectations: since universities tend to be in large urban centers, so are respondents from the email campaign. 44% of respondents from the Facebook campaign compared to 34% of the respondents from the email campaign indicated that they belong to the majority group in their local community (see Figure 3). This may reflect a higher share of foreign nationals among the sample of university students (25% compared to 20% through Facebook). Most university students chose to answer the questionnaire in English, while most other respondents preferred Arabic.

Figure 2: Age distribution



Source: Own illustration

Figure 3: Do you belong to the majority group in your local community?




Source: Own illustration

A lack of responses to the question of gender and the current location - posed early in the survey - are noteworthy: 43% of respondents refused to indicate their gender. Among those who did provide this information, 58% were female which may shed more light on their willingness to share information rather than the gender composition of the sample. In 2015, a population and household census found 47% of the population living in Jordan to be female (UNICEF, 2016). Almost half of the respondents refused to share their current regional location of residence, which we asked for in terms of governorates - an aggregated geographical level (see Figure 5). Their unwillingness to share this type of information is interpreted as confirming some level of mistrust in online data collections. It is possible that this mistrust is not equally distributed among the population, i.e. particularly prevalent among certain population


groups, which might introduce a selection effect. While this poses very relevant research questions, they cannot be addressed in this article.

Figure 4: Country of origin



Source: Own illustration

Figure 5: Where do respondents live within Jordan?



Source: Own illustration

To the extent that information on localities is provided: the largest share of respondents currently lives in Amman (65%), followed by Irbid and Zarqa. These are also the largest governorates in Jordan with more than 1000 inhabitants per km² accounting for two thirds of Jordan's total population in 2013, and three quarters in 2015 (Abasa, 2013; UNICEF, 2016).


4.2. Measures of social cohesion

As discussed in Section 2.4, there are a variety of social cohesion measures available. The following Sections will first look at direct proxies for social cohesion – namely feeling a '*sense of belonging to the local community*' – before turning to alternative measures and dimensions as proposed and extended upon in the literature discussed before.

4.2.1. Direct proxies of social cohesion – a sense of belonging to the local community

65% of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they “feel a sense of belonging to their local community” (see Figure 6). On an individual level, this is a direct proxy for social inclusion, whereas on an aggregate level, this indicator is a proxy for social cohesion - the larger the share of individuals who feel a sense of belonging to their local communities, the more cohesive is a given community.

Figure 6: Feeling of belonging to local community



Source: Own illustration

Disaggregating this indicator by different groups suggests that Jordanians tend to be more socially integrated compared to other nationalities. Still, 55% of non-Jordanians indicate a sense of belonging to their local communities. The fact that the strongest sense of belonging to the local community is found among the group targeted via social media might be related to social media being an important vehicle of social integration, connecting to others and coordinating local events. Respondents that stated that they belong to the majority group have significantly stronger feelings of belonging to the local community as compared to those that are not part of the majority group. Also, there exists a significant difference between those who indicate that they are actively engaged in the community and those stating that they “feel like an active member of the society”. While the latter finding in particular corresponds with our

expectation, it is surprising that the correlation between feeling a sense of belonging and feeling like an active member of society is somewhat weaker than anticipated⁵ as both indicators seemed to measure similar concepts.

A REACH (2014a) survey conducted between December 2013 and March 2014 among 7,158 Jordanians and Syrians residing in northern governorates (2014a) found that 74% of the respondents felt a sense of belonging to the local community (88% of Jordanians and 60% of Syrians). This indicates more social cohesion than found in this sample, which is driven by a lower sense of social inclusion among Jordanians⁶. While selection effects may play a role, part of this difference may hint at an increasing sense of detachment felt among Jordanians unfolding over time. REACH (2014a) also finds that around half of the Syrians who did not feel part of the community indicated that this was due to difficulties integrating. Note that these indicators do not allow identifying effects of social segregation – it is possible that different groups, e.g. Jordanians and non-Jordanians, systematically differ in their definition of local communities, especially if they are physically separated in urban areas.

4.2.2. Dimensions of the Social Cohesion Index – trust, group identity, and inequality

Trust

As established by the literature throughout Section 2, trust is an important dimension of social cohesion and regularly used as a direct proxy in the empirical literature. Going beyond common measures of generalized trust in ‘people unknown’ to an individual, respondents were asked whether they trust different groups of people, including people of different nationalities.

Unsurprisingly, the highest level of trust is found among close relatives (70%) and friends (85%)) (see Figure 7). These levels of trust can serve as ‘anchor’ when assessing the level of trust towards other groups (e.g. strangers) as trust should be interpreted in relative terms (i.e. the difference between trust towards these anchors and towards other groups). Put differently: a person with a high level of generalized trust is not expected to blindly trust strangers, but to show a relatively small gap in trust compared to his trust in his close family and friends.⁷

As expected, least trust is shown towards people that the respondents do not know (12%), while around 37% of respondents trust their neighbors, which presumably comprise both individuals known to respondents or people that they are familiar with as well as strangers. Trust towards Syrians (40%) and Jordanians (38%) is both comparable to trust in neighbors, yet a higher share of respondents refused to answer this question (see Appendix 2) or chose the ‘don’t know’ option. This may indicate some degree of


⁵ Correlation coefficient of 0.248

⁶ Note that the question and response categories were not exactly the same.

⁷ Trust differs from trustworthiness. While respondents can typically assess trustworthiness of people known by them (e.g. family and friends), the trustworthiness of strangers is unknown.

socially desirable answering behavior – indicating that not trusting anonymous and heterogeneous groups of neighbors or strangers may be easier than expressing distrust towards specific nationalities.

Figure 7: Trust in different groups



Normal distribution superimposed over options other than don't know.


Source: Own illustration

No significant differences are found for measures of trust between Jordanians and non-Jordanians other than that foreign-born individuals exercise more trust towards the group of other non-Jordanians. This is consistent with foreign born individuals identifying and potentially feeling more sympathetic towards other foreign born. In terms of differences across campaign types, respondents of the Facebook campaign are significantly more trusting towards their neighbors, Jordanians and Syrians (on average between 16 and 25 percentage points in magnitude), yet they are also twice as likely to refuse answering this set of questions (on average 50% compared to 25% respondents refused). Note that the level of trust both groups exercise towards family and friends – the ‘anchors’ - is not significantly different (see Appendix 2).

Identity – feeling a sense of belonging to different groups

To better understand how young people define their reference group and with whom they identify, respondents were asked to indicate towards which group they feel the strongest sense of belonging. This is to determine the lines along which in-groups and out-groups are defined. As mentioned above, the literature on diversity focuses on ethno-linguistic and religious identities, often implicitly assuming that these characteristics define overall group identities.

Figure 8: Sense of belonging to different groups



Source: Own illustration


Figure 8 illustrates that family is the major reference point for most young people by far, which holds regardless of the campaign type and confirms expectations, especially in this family-centered cultural setting. The second most important group shows substantial variation, yet respondents feel the second strongest sense of belonging to individuals within the same age group and to people with similar interests. To the extent that similar interests are found among individuals of the same age, both groups capture similar things. While it is possible that similar interests are also driven by one's ethnicity and religious beliefs, it is worth noting that respondents could have opted for these characteristics directly but provided a more nuanced picture of group identities instead: among the choices offered, a sense of belonging to the individuals sharing the same ethnicity/tribe was chosen to be among the three most important groups by around 20% of respondents; the same local language by around 11%; and the same religious beliefs by around 20%, whereas people of the same age were selected by around 50%; and people with similar interests by another 52% of respondents. In particular, respondents from the Facebook campaign also named neighbors to be an important group to feel a sense of belonging to. This is an interesting result as while they are actively participating in social media they are still locally attached within their neighborhood.

Perceived inequality


As seen in Section 2 and as Langer *et al.* (2016) acknowledge in their conceptual framework, inequality plays a vital role in social cohesion: a strong sense of perceived inequalities is harmful to social cohesion.

In Jordan, perceived inequalities in the allocation of aid, for instance, were identified as sources of tension between refugees and host populations (see Section 3.1).

Figure 9: Living conditions compared to others



Normal distribution superimposed over options other than don't know.



Source: Own illustration

The survey focuses on economic inequalities by asking about respondents' own living conditions compared to 'most other people in the local community'. 42% of respondents judged their own living conditions to be better than those of most other community members. This is driven by respondents of the email campaign, where 62% indicated to being better off than other people in their community (see Figure 9 and Appendix 2). As the survey was spread through university networks these results are in line with expectations. This is also confirmed when comparing the answers of those attending school or university or having a job and those who do not. About a third of respondents indicated that their living conditions are similar to local peers; which is the same across campaign types and nationalities.

In the sample, there is no significant difference between Jordanians and foreign-born individuals in judging their own relative living conditions. If the sample had comprised more Syrian refugees, this would likely have been different. Also, it is important to note that all respondents have easy access to internet and hence, to information. This strengthens their opportunity to judge their relative economic situation.


4.2.3. Dimensions of the Relational Capability Index

Network integration – economic inclusion and communication

Regarding network integration in terms of access to communication technologies, Figure 10 shows the vast majority of respondents communicate via phone and internet daily with no differences across the sub-samples. While the sample is likely biased towards well ICT-connected individuals, we would assume to see a similar picture among the non-sampled youth. In fact, the expected high prevalence and frequency of ICT technologies use, exemplified by a lack of variation in access to and use of mobile devices and the internet suggests that there is scope and a need to find more meaningful indicators for digital network integration that aim at capturing qualitative differences in the *use* of such technologies. These could, for instance be related to the (perceived) efficiency in using them for enlarging private networks and gaining access to new opportunities.


Two thirds of respondents currently attend school or university, which can be interpreted as an indicator of social integration. Around 25% of email campaign respondents negated this question implying that the email campaign's reach did go beyond university students (see Figure 10).

Figure 10: Network integration



Source: Own illustration

Figure 11: Economic integration



Normal distribution superimposed over options other than don't know.

Source: Own illustration


To work formally and without concerns about legal repercussions, foreign-born individuals require a work permit. Receiving such permit is rather difficult, especially for the refugees (e.g. NRC, 2016). Given the sensitivity of inquiring about a work permit after asking respondents about whether they worked, the

questions of having a job and attending school/university were combined. The sensitivity of the work permit question is confirmed by the share of respondents who chose to refuse answering (24%) (see Figure 11). While it is not possible to assess how many foreign respondents would currently like to work or are already engaged in employment, only 30% of them – who are all working age – have a work permit. This might imply limited opportunities for their economic integration but the results may also be driven by the fact that there are several foreign-born university students in the sample that currently do not need a work permit.⁸

In accordance with the policy reports and other literature discussed in Section 3 most respondents indicate that there is a lack of job opportunities in their local communities. Only 23% of respondents agree that there are enough job opportunities available – an assessment that is significantly more prevalent among Facebook campaign respondents (see Figure 11 and Appendix 2).

Private relations

Figure 12: Having friends of different nationality whom one would rely on for help



Source: Own illustration

Inquiring about friends who are of different nationalities was both aimed at assessing the dimension of ‘private relations’ used in the RCI (see Section 2.4.1) and to the concept of contact theory (see Section 2.3). The ‘quality’ of the relationship was specified by asking about friends one would rely on for help as to differentiate friends from acquaintances. This variable is considered as a proxy indicator for out-group contact (acknowledging that group identities can be such that friends are considered in-group members independent of their nationality): Still, it is assumed that individuals who have close foreign friends tend to have more frequent and potentially more intense contacts to out-group members than individuals who do not have foreign friends. This in turn is hypothesized to be conducive to social cohesion.

While the sample is too small to firmly investigate this hypothesis and to perform meaningful multi-variate analyses (also see Appendix 1b), it should be noted that individuals with foreign friends show somewhat

Almost three quarters of respondents have friends of a different nationality that they would rely on for help. There are significant differences across campaign types: almost 60% of Facebook campaign respondents answered affirmatively while close to 90% of the email respondents stated to have foreign friends. This reaffirms the importance of public places – such as community and youth centers, universities, sports and playgrounds, and parks to meet in.

Inquiring about friends who are of different

⁸ Excluding foreign students from the analysis shows that the majority of respondents (42%) has a work permit.

higher levels of generalized trust (i.e. more trust towards people they do not know). There are no significant differences found across these groups in terms of their sense of belonging to the community.

Private relations as a dimension of the RCI also include aspects related to the closeness of family ties, which is discussed in the context of group identities (see Section 4.2.2) and trust in the community⁹.

Civic commitment

Community engagement has often been used as an important proxy for social capital and has also been acknowledged as an important dimension of social cohesion. More than 90% of the respondents have helped a person in the past twelve months that they did not know (see Figure 13). This is a surprisingly high number, yet the recall period is very long. The Bertelsmann Foundation found that across several (mainly European) countries on average 47% have helped a stranger in the past month (Dragolov *et al.*, 2013). 61% of Facebook respondents and approximately half of the email campaign respondents have worked jointly with others in the past 12 months to solve a problem in their local community. While this survey does not have any information on the social media use of email respondents, it is assumed that Facebook respondents are more active on Facebook at least. This may give them some advantage of learning about and contributing to community level projects and initiatives.

Most respondents feel like an active member of society (56%, see Appendix 2). A higher percentage of the email campaign respondents disagree with this statement while more Facebook campaign respondents strongly agree (see Figure 13). The latter is consistent with their higher levels of civic commitment reported before: it seems that respondents of the Facebook campaign tend to be more active members of society and as a result also have a stronger feeling of being an active member.

Almost 80% of respondents expressed a desire to participate more actively in their society. This wish was even more pronounced among respondents of the email campaign, which makes sense, as they are currently not as actively engaged compared to those of the Facebook campaign. For a discussion on barriers to active participation, see Section 4.2.5.

⁹ Trust in the community is operationalized differently – the RCI focusses on trust in people *known* to respondents where this survey differentiates specific groups and focuses on trust in people *unknown* when thinking about generalized trust. It asks about changes in trust towards people *known* when considering changes over time (see Chapter 4.2.4).

Figure 13: Civic commitment



Source: Own illustration

4.2.4. Changes over time


As discussed in Section 3, related to war and displacement in neighboring countries, population figures in Jordan continue to rise and have been associated with increased tensions between host and refugee population groups, declining community resilience and a weakening of social cohesion. Against this background, it is important to look at *changes* in social cohesion proxies, which is done for the indicators of ‘feeling a sense of belonging’ and ‘trust in different population groups’ with a reference frame of the past two years, or since individuals arrived in their local community.

Changes in the feeling of belonging

Almost two thirds of respondents feel the same or a stronger sense of belonging to their local community as compared to two years ago (see Figure 14). While on average, responses are similar across campaign types as well as across Jordanians and foreign born individuals (see Appendix 2), we see some differences when looking at the more extreme responses. In the email campaign, for instance, responses were relatively equally distributed from stronger to weaker feelings. A smaller share of Facebook respondents, however, indicated stronger feelings of belonging and tended to lean more towards feeling the same or weaker towards their local community compared to two years ago. Cautiously interpreting this indicator as one that reveals changes in social cohesion, these findings suggest that changes in community level social cohesion over the past two years have been limited. At the same time, underlying dynamics e.g. as to

which population groups are in a position to contribute to social cohesion may have changed considerably.

Figure 14: Changes in feeling of belonging



Normal distribution superimposed over options other than don't know.

Source: Own illustration

Regarding respondents who have only recently (i.e. less than two years ago) moved to their current location: Respondents from both campaigns predominantly feel a stronger or the same sense of belonging as compared to when they first arrived (see Figure 14, note small number of observations). This is reasonable as a sense of belonging takes time to grow.

Notably, respondents that did not consider themselves as active members of their local community are significantly more likely to indicate feeling a weaker sense of belonging to their local community as compared to two years ago (see Figure 14). Differently put, social outsiders may perceive being further excluded over time.


Changes in trust

To assess changes in trust, only individuals who have been living in their community for at least two years are considered since there are too few observations for individuals who only recently moved to the local community.

Overall, the data reveals a tendency of having less trust: In line with expectations, changes in trust have been most favorable towards people known to respondents: 67% of respondents indicate that they trust

the people they know more or the same compared to two years ago. Somewhat surprisingly, however, 31% of respondents indicate that they have less trust in their personal networks. Levels of generalized trust (i.e. trust in people unknown) have not changed for 46% of respondents, while almost one third of respondents indicated that they are less trusting (see Figure 15).

Figure 15: Changes in trust



Source: Own illustration


Changes in trust towards different nationalities have been most favorable (i.e. remained the same or improved) towards Jordanians with 53% of respondents (who are mostly Jordanians) saying that the level of trust remained the same or it improved for 10% (see Figure 15). Concerning other foreigners - the group towards which there is the lowest current level of trust (see Section 4.2.2) - 55% of respondents indicated that this trust has not changed or improved over the past 2 years.

With respect to Syrians - who currently enjoy similar levels of trust as Jordanians do (see Section 4.2.2) - compared to two years ago, changes in trust have been less favorable: 36% of respondents indicate that their trust in Syrians has remained the same or increased (4%), while another third indicates that they trust Syrians less. However, it is important to note that refusal to reply to these questions or to indicate 'don't know' are largest in number (48% and 10% respectively) when asking about specific nationalities.

4.2.5. Barriers to participating in society

Most of the youth in the sample expressed a desire to more actively participate in society (see Figure 16).

Figure 16: Desire to participate more actively in society




Source: Own illustration

In general, the analysis confirms the relevance of commonly mentioned barriers, such as 'lack of public spaces' and 'not knowing about possibilities' to actively engage in the community. Both issues are identified as barriers for participation by around two thirds of respondents. 'Activities being too far away' - to the extent that people know - is a barrier according to half of respondents (see Figure 17). In this indicator, there is a significant difference between Facebook and email campaign respondents (see Appendix 2): 65% of Facebook compared to 45% of other respondents state distance as being an issue. This may hint at Facebook respondents being more informed about existing activities beyond their local context.

Given fears of isolation resulting from rising levels of tensions, it was anticipated that 'security concerns for personal safety play an equally prominent role in hindering participation, yet it does not. However, the fact that one third of respondents agree that safety concerns are hindering their active participation in society is still reason to be concerned.

This corresponds to previous reports of youth in Jordan and the MENA region who want to be actors of change and take an active role in shaping their own and their communities' future (e.g. NRC, 2016, OECD 2016). At the same time, a desire to engage more actively implies the existence of barriers of doing so now. The barriers discussed in what follows are informed by existing policy reports and calls for action, which give us the opportunity of assessing their perceived relevance among the youth in this sample.

Figure 17: Barriers to actively participating in society



Normal distribution superimposed over options other than don't know.

Source: Own illustration

4.2.6. How to strengthen social cohesion?

Given the central role of individual community members in strengthening social cohesion, open-ended questions were used to identify how youth define socially cohesive environments and how they would like to contribute¹⁰.

A selection of exemplary statements that represent the general tone of responses that were received are presented below.

How does a local environment look like that supports a sense of togetherness?

“A community in which everyone works for the benefit of all, and things like religion and ethnicity do not matter as much as contributing and belonging to the community.”

“In my opinion, I believe that it all depends on the people who are willing to understand and trust each other. It also depends on the environment if it provides enough support and encourages members of the community by developing activities or programs.”

“A sense of togetherness means that people within the society support each other and celebrate with each other in times of happiness and grief in times of sadness. This boosts trust among the community and society as a whole. Also, this exact sense means that people will support others in their society who are not well of and need help to succeed. This leads to a very successful community.”

“People who are financially stable, people who are actually living a life and not only worry about what and how to feed their family and provide shelter to them. In other words, if people are not living a decent living, supporting local community will be the least of their worries.”

“Once the community members become interdependent, there will always be hope and sense of togetherness.”

How would you like to support a sense of togetherness?

“By raising awareness on benefiting from our differences. Our diversity should make us stronger. [...] I support the idea of educating people how diversities makes organizations stronger.”

“By looking past our differences, our last names, our origins, our tribes, and more into who we are as humans”

“More interactive activities to get the neighborhood together, as currently one doesn't even know their own neighbors”

“Well, doing more activities to help people get to know each other more. Talking sessions where each person talks about his background and preferably people from different religions, origins and so on.”

“Random acts of kindness”

In sum, existing definitions of cohesive societies and associated benefits substantially overlap with frameworks and concepts proposed in the literature (see Section 2). The concepts of trust and solidarity, for instance, are often stressed and mentioned in the context of relationships across different groups in society, which corresponds to the concept of bridging (see Section 2.4). Different groups in society are often described along religious and ethnic lines. Regarding the question of how respondents see *their*

¹⁰ Rather than using the term social cohesion, it was enquired about a “sense of togetherness” and the underlying open-ended questions were introduced by explaining that: “Some scholars say that a sense of togetherness helps keeping a society united and peaceful.”

potential role in contributing to social cohesion, they frequently stress the importance of connecting in public spaces and participating in municipality-level projects.

A noteworthy assessment is made by a respondent in the context of poverty and vulnerability and it is argued that, in a situation of existential hardship, people don't have the capacity to care about social cohesion. To put it differently – even if the benefits of cohesive societies are well known and aspired to - a minimum level of social protection and wellbeing is required for individuals to be in a position of actively contributing to it.

5. Conclusion

With most refugees settling in urban areas, many communities are exposed to a risk of rising tensions between refugees and Jordanians. Mindful of the importance of social cohesion, the Jordanian government has signed the Jordan Compact which provides opportunities, especially for municipalities hosting large numbers of Syrians. Existing studies show how missing economic opportunities and inadequate access to basic services, such as water, education, health services, solid waste collection, and affordable housing, are key factors contributing to public dissatisfaction and rising social tensions. To prevent an escalation of such tensions to social conflicts, it is critical to establish and strengthen a sense of togetherness among the host population and refugees. While operational definitions vary, trust and belonging are key aspects of social cohesion. Understanding how Jordanians and refugees perceive changes in social cohesion is important in its own right, and can also contribute to developing integrated solutions to social existing challenges.

Based on novel survey data, this article sheds light on the current situation and the engagement and feeling of young people towards their local community. The data was collected through a social media survey among young people, which allows collecting information from large numbers of respondents in real time, but comes with methodological caveats. The results are therefore not necessarily representative of the overall refugee youth population, nor for all young Jordanians, but provide a sense of how respondents perceive social cohesion in their communities. The majority of respondents perceive themselves to be slightly better off than other members of their communities. Few are unemployed and most attend school or university, or have a job. Overall, respondents do not seem to be excluded from society in broader socio-economic terms.

The analysis highlights several unexpected results. First, we do not find a general mistrust towards foreigners or certain nationalities but rather towards strangers in more general terms. Second, friendship and trust appear relatively common between young Jordanians and refugees, and the majority of the respondents have friend(s) with a different nationality whom they would rely on for help. Third, our preferred measure for social cohesion points in a similar direction: Most respondents expressed a feeling of belonging to their local community. While the sense of belonging is more pronounced among Jordanian youth, more than half of the foreign-born respondents also report a sense of belonging, which

seems most pronounced for young people that can actively engage and participate in society. Importantly, the results indicate that social outsiders might become further excluded over time, especially when strangers move into a community, which would underscore the importance of targeting the most excluded youth.

Fourth, while the community level social cohesion measure is very stable for the past two years, the personal level trust dimension of social cohesion shows a slight decline. Nearly one out three respondents describes him- or herself as less trusting towards strangers, compared to two years earlier. The loss of personal level trust seems to have been declining the fastest towards Syrians, which may hint towards growing tensions in some communities.

With regards to how social cohesion could be strengthened, the analysis explores how identities of young people are shaped. Key drivers are age and similar interests – rather than nationality, ethnicity or religion. These results indicate that it could be possible to foster social cohesion by supporting youth of similar age groups to participate in activities of shared interests. In fact, respondents show an elevated level of social commitment and some youth are active members of the society and are involved in their community. Young Jordanians and refugees specifically emphasize the importance of connecting in public spaces and participating in municipality-level projects to contribute to social cohesion, and a large share would like to participate more actively in their local community. Overall, these results confirm a strong willingness of young people to be actors of change. However, few public spaces exist, and knowledge about possibilities to actively engage at the community level remains limited, according to interviewed youth, the main factors hindering more active social participation.

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IV. Appendix

Appendix 1 Survey data collection report

a. Development of survey instrument

The survey instrument for measuring social cohesion was developed based on the conceptual framework presented in Section 2, particularly the Social Cohesion Index and the Relational Capability Index (see Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2), and the Jordanian context as discussed in Section 3. In what follows, we highlight areas in which the operationalization of social cohesion differs from or goes beyond dimensions proposed in these indices. It is important to note that while social cohesion is not a clearly defined concept, the different dimensions proposed in the literature and chosen for the setting of this study nevertheless point towards the same direction and interestingly, the respondent's definitions of social cohesion largely overlap with these.

The target group comprises young people (age 18 to 35) of all nationalities residing in Jordan at the time of the survey. Note that we identify refugees who live outside camps by making assumptions based on their place of birth: Syrians currently living in Jordan are assumed to belong to the refugee population. Information on non-Syrian refugees and other migrant groups living in Jordan is scarce. While this motivates to include non-Syrian foreigners in the target group, making assumptions about their refugee status (if they do not live in refugee camp) is difficult to justify. At the same time, the relevance of including non-Syrian foreigners is not only associated with their potential refugee background, but stems from the fact that social cohesion or a lack thereof affects all nationalities and population groups in a given environment. In addition, it is possible that, with large numbers of Syrian refugees arriving in a given location, dynamics between host community members and non-Syrian foreigners change. A presumed tendency of socializing with individuals within the same age range, however, justifies the exclusive focus on youth. In the geographical reach, we go beyond the main focus of existing studies on forced displacement in Jordan, which mainly cover northern regions hosting the largest number of refugees. It is worth noting that when we refer to the 'host population' in what follows, we are talking about individuals born and currently living in Jordan. It is beyond the scope of this research to include in this group those born outside of Jordan who gained citizenship by naturalization (see Section 3)

As Forrest *et al.* (2001) point out, measuring social cohesion requires specifying a local reference frame. It is possible, for instance, to have very cohesive neighborhoods, while conflicts arise between neighborhoods. The local reference frame that we refer to throughout the instrument is the "local community". Acknowledging that this term does not have a uniform definition and thus includes an individual-specific component, we argue that it is the relevant sphere of action where social interactions takes place and potential tensions between and among refugee and host community youth manifest themselves.

The set of socioeconomic variables includes the age and gender of respondents, their place of birth and region of residence, whether they live in urban, rural areas or refugee camps, since when they are living in Jordan and when they arrived in their current location. The latter variables also serve as a temporal anchor for selected recall questions that aim at shedding some light on temporal dynamics since the duration of living in a community is assumed to influence local integration.

Following REACH (2014a), as a first proxy measure of social cohesion, we ask about feeling “a sense of belonging to the local community”. We also ask respondents to assess their sense of belonging either compared to two years ago or compared to when they first arrived in their local community (for those who live there for less than 2 years). Other social cohesion components for which we ask similar dynamic recall questions include trust in specific groups and civic engagement.

Building on the established Social Cohesion Index, many indicators used are perception based indicators of socioeconomic inclusion and exclusion (e.g. “In my local community, there are enough job opportunities” with an answering scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree). Some items of socioeconomic inclusion and exclusion go beyond existing measures and reflect dimensions of social cohesion specific to displacement and the local context. Asking non-Jordanians about whether or not they have a work permit, for instance, reflects barriers to integration and insecurities associated with a lack of valid legal documents that push many refugees into informality (e.g. NRC, 2016; REACH, 2015).

While the importance of group identities is specifically acknowledged in the Social Cohesion Index and in the literature on social cohesion more generally, defining relevant groups and operationalizing their role for individual identities are import gaps in the literature (Pervaiz *et al.*, 2013). Diversity studies usually focus on ethnic, linguistic and religious groups (Ibid), which is not covering all groups relevant in the local context and is partly also sensitive to ask. In contribution to identifying group identities, we ask individuals to identify three groups to which they feel the strongest sense of belonging, including their family, people with similar interests, people of the same tribe, same religious believes, and others. We aim at cushioning sensitivity by deliberate ordering of the groups; with sensitive groups at the end of the list. We extend the list of groups compared to ‘standard measures’ also when we ask about trust (e.g. enquiring about trust towards ‘[fellow] Syrians’, ‘[fellow] Jordanians’ etc. as opposed to solely focusing on ‘people I know’ and ‘people I don’t know’).

Finally, with the aim of providing some evidence about how social cohesion can be promoted, we explicitly enquire about specific barriers to actively participate in society. The selection of possible barriers is informed by a comprehensive literature review. The questionnaire concludes by randomly posing one of two open ended question about local environments that “support a sense of togetherness among people living in the local community”: Respondents were either asked how a supportive local environment would look like or how *they* would like supporting a sense of togetherness.

b. Data collection

The data collection was designed as a social media survey in that it was an online survey conducted via social media channels. The survey was programmed in both English and Arabic using a standard online survey tool.¹¹ The data collection followed a two-stage procedure: In stage one, a web link to the survey tool is distributed to the target audience. The social media data collection was channeled to youth in the target age via Facebook and Instagram¹². Additional data came from a targeted email campaign focusing on university students. For the email campaign, we informed scholars at local universities about the research and asked them to share the survey link with their students whom the survey description encouraged to share the link further. The survey is self-administered, i.e. in the second stage respondents fill out the questionnaires themselves online. The design was compatible for both smartphones and computer screens.

This survey design is associated with several unique opportunities and limitations. In terms of opportunities, using advertisements on social media channels has the potential of reaching a large target audience, especially young people, at very low costs. The advertisement can be administered in a highly flexible manner, defining specific target audiences based on the age, demographic and location profiles users share via their account. An apparent downside of this survey technique is selection biases introduced by reaching only those who use a smartphone or computers and specific social media channels. While this is a valid challenge, exclusively focusing on a young audience – like we do here- should limit this selection bias. Estimated internet use in Jordan has increased from a population share of 27% in 2010 to 53% in 2015¹³ (ITU, 2017). ICT and social media use is very prevalent among the youth so much so that the OECD (2016) advocates capitalizing on digital technologies for inclusive policy making in the MENA region and specifically for enabling the youth to actively participate in society. There are approximately 3.8 million individuals who have a registered Facebook account in Jordan¹⁴. In 2014, 80% of Facebook users in Jordan were between the age of 15 and 29 (OECD, 2016). Maitland *et al.* (2015) confirm internet and social media use to be very prevalent also in refugee camps and a social media survey has been used to collect data in Jordan before (Groh *et al.*, 2016).

A total of 444 individual survey responses were collected between January and March 2017 (Table 1). Two major challenges were encountered during this survey: (1) relatively low survey uptake and (2) ensuring the participation of Syrian refugees. In both cases communication and trust are possible explanations: Consultations with local experts suggested the topic of social cohesion to be very sensitive and fear of sharing personal information to be problematic, particularly among refugees. To increase survey uptake and to increase trust, the data collection instrument was adjusted following a pilot phase. To increase the appeal of the advertisement, we incentivized survey participation by introducing vouchers that could be

¹¹ QuestionPro Software

¹² We will refer to this as Facebook campaign in what follows.

¹³ Among age 5+.

¹⁴ Information provided by marketing firm that programmed the advertisement – ‘Yadonia Group’.

won upon participating and sharing the link on Facebook. The latter was also meant to introduce ‘organic advertisement’, i.e. distributing the link through known contacts instead of anonymous advertisements that aimed at increasing uptake by increasing trust. The link to the online survey was further distributed through university networks, which did imply that respondents received the link through someone they know. By complementing the Facebook sample with the email campaign, we are reaching somewhat different parts of the society, in this case, mainly university students. While this enriches the sample, it also introduces additional selection effects. This was not however expected to increase the share of Syrian respondents since we assume that they only have very limited access to university education. We differentiate between campaign types when presenting the results (see Section 4). Other measures to increase trust between the first pilot phase and second survey round included providing more background information on the study and contact information of the research team at the beginning of the survey; to remove what was assessed to be the most sensitive question – on trust in local government institutions; and to refer more prominently to the option of ‘refusing’ answering any given question. Future research should try exploiting secondary data to shed light on the extent and potential implication of selection effects.

Table 1: Sample characteristics

Data collection January-March 2017 using QuestionPro Online Survey Tool

Initial data collection: 25.01.2017 - 30.01.2017

2nd round data collection: 27.02.2017 - 27.03.2017

Observations and dropouts

In the 2nd round of data collection, the survey was advertised via Facebook/Instagramm and through an email campaign

	Viewed on QuestionPro (after language selection)	Survey started	Survey terminated (respondents outside target group)	Incomplete surveys (i.e. early drop outs)	Survey completed	Starting rate	Completion rate (among target group)	Average time spent on survey (among target group)
Facebook campaign	1691	376	124	146	106	0.22	0.42	7 mins
Email campaign	206	180	24	47	109	0.87	0.70	10.5 mins
	1897	556	148	193	215			
		obs for analysis 2nd round:			408			
		1st round of data collection:			12	24		
		obs for analysis 1st and 2nd round:			444			

Source: Own illustration

In total, we received 1,897 views on the online survey page. Around 30% of those resulted in started surveys. While the survey was automatically terminated in 148 cases due to respondents being outside of the target group, 205 individuals chose to drop out of the survey early (see Table 1). For both campaign types, the average time to complete the full survey was around 11.5 minutes; early drop-outs spent on average 5 minutes before terminating the survey. The email campaign was most successful in increasing survey uptake and reducing drop-outs: both starting and completion rates were substantially higher among the email compared to the Facebook campaign. Section 4.1 describes the sample in more detail.

Appendix 2 Socioeconomic characteristics for different samples

	Full sample		Email campaign	Facebook campaign	Diff. FB vs. email	Foreign born	Diff foreign vs. Jod.
	mean/(sd)	obs.	mean/(sd)	mean/(sd)	diff/(sd)	mean/(sd)	diff/(sd)
=1 for Arabic language	0.72 (0.45)	444	0.30 (0.46)	0.95 (0.22)	0.65*** (0.03)	0.62 (0.49)	-0.13** (0.05)
How old are you?	24.73 (5.12)	444	21.75 (3.86)	26.34 (4.99)	4.59*** (0.46)	25.36 (5.42)	0.85 (0.56)
=1 for males	0.42 (0.49)	251	0.46 (0.50)	0.39 (0.49)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.40 (0.49)	-0.03 (0.08)
Do you currently have a job or attend school/university?	0.66 (0.47)	349	0.76 (0.43)	0.59 (0.49)	-0.17*** (0.05)	0.68 (0.47)	0.03 (0.06)
Do you have a work permit?	0.39 (0.49)	71	0.19 (0.40)	0.55 (0.50)	0.36** (0.11)	0.39 (0.49)	0.00 (0.00)
=1 for agreeing to 'there are enough job opportunities in local community'	0.23 (0.42)	348	0.15 (0.36)	0.28 (0.45)	0.13** (0.05)	0.21 (0.41)	-0.03 (0.06)
=1 for perceiving own situation as better compared to others	0.42 (0.49)	336	0.62 (0.49)	0.28 (0.45)	-0.35*** (0.05)	0.50 (0.50)	0.10 (0.07)
=1 for perceiving own situation as same compared to others	0.36 (0.48)	336	0.32 (0.47)	0.39 (0.49)	0.07 (0.05)	0.31 (0.46)	-0.07 (0.07)
=1 for perceiving own situation as worse compared to others	0.18 (0.39)	336	0.05 (0.22)	0.28 (0.45)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.15 (0.36)	-0.05 (0.05)
=1 if phone is used on a daily basis	0.86 (0.35)	304	0.89 (0.32)	0.84 (0.37)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.80 (0.41)	-0.08 (0.05)
=1 if internet is used on a daily basis	0.81 (0.40)	303	0.84 (0.37)	0.78 (0.42)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.78 (0.42)	-0.03 (0.06)
=1 for feeling a sense of belonging to local community	0.66 (0.48)	308	0.55 (0.50)	0.73 (0.44)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.55 (0.50)	-0.13 (0.07)
=1 if stronger or same sense of belonging (compared to 2yrs ago)	0.65 (0.48)	254	0.64 (0.48)	0.65 (0.48)	0.02 (0.06)	0.64 (0.49)	-0.01 (0.08)

	Full sample		Email campaign	Facebook campaign	Diff. FB vs. email	Foreign born	Diff foreign vs. Jod.
=1 if stronger or same sense of belonging (compared to 1st arrival in local community)	0.80	55	0.80	0.80	-0.00	0.82	0.03
	(0.40)		(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.11)	(0.39)	(0.11)
=1 for belonging to majority group	0.39	266	0.34	0.44	0.11	0.29	-0.12
	(0.49)		(0.47)	(0.50)	(0.06)	(0.46)	(0.08)
=1 for trusting: my close relatives	0.70	254	0.71	0.69	-0.02	0.77	0.08
	(0.46)		(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.06)	(0.43)	(0.07)
=1 for trusting: my friends	0.84	251	0.88	0.80	-0.07	0.82	-0.02
	(0.37)		(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.05)	(0.39)	(0.06)
=1 for trusting: my neighbors	0.37	243	0.26	0.47	0.20***	0.42	0.07
	(0.48)		(0.44)	(0.50)	(0.06)	(0.50)	(0.08)
=1 for trusting: people I don't know	0.12	246	0.09	0.15	0.06	0.11	-0.01
	(0.32)		(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.04)	(0.31)	(0.05)
=1 for trusting: Jordanians	0.38	226	0.30	0.46	0.16*	0.45	0.09
	(0.49)		(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.06)	(0.50)	(0.08)
=1 for trusting: Syrians	0.40	235	0.27	0.52	0.25***	0.48	0.10
	(0.49)		(0.45)	(0.50)	(0.06)	(0.51)	(0.08)
=1 for trusting: other Non-Jordanians	0.26	237	0.26	0.27	0.01	0.42	0.20**
	(0.44)		(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.06)	(0.50)	(0.07)
=1 if stronger or same trust (compared to 2yrs ago): people you know	0.67	230	0.62	0.72	0.11	0.69	0.01
	(0.47)		(0.49)	(0.45)	(0.06)	(0.47)	(0.09)
=1 if stronger or same trust (compared to 2yrs ago): people you don't know	0.52	226	0.58	0.47	-0.12	0.47	-0.06
	(0.50)		(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.07)	(0.51)	(0.09)
=1 if stronger or same trust (compared to 2yrs ago): Jordanians	0.63	219	0.64	0.63	-0.01	0.56	-0.09
	(0.48)		(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.07)	(0.50)	(0.09)
=1 if stronger or same trust (compared to 2yrs ago): Syrians	0.40	214	0.55	0.25	-0.29***	0.49	0.11
	(0.49)		(0.50)	(0.44)	(0.06)	(0.51)	(0.09)
=1 if stronger or same trust (compared to 2yrs ago): Other Non-Jordanians	0.55	215	0.67	0.43	-0.24***	0.58	0.04
	(0.50)		(0.47)	(0.50)	(0.07)	(0.50)	(0.09)
=1 for having foreign friends whom one would rely on for help	0.72	248	0.88	0.59	-0.29***	0.85	0.16*
	(0.45)		(0.33)	(0.49)	(0.05)	(0.36)	(0.07)
=1 if helped stranger in past 12 months	0.93	242	0.92	0.94	0.02	0.91	-0.03
	(0.26)		(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.03)	(0.29)	(0.04)

	Full sample		Email campaign	Facebook campaign	Diff. FB vs. email	Foreign born	Diff foreign vs. Jod.
=1 if engaged in community work in past 12 months	0.56	216	0.46	0.64	0.18**	0.57	0.02
	(0.50)		(0.50)	(0.48)	(0.07)	(0.50)	(0.09)
=1 if engaged in community work since arriving in local community	0.43	21	0.36	0.50	0.14	0.33	-0.13
	(0.51)		(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.23)	(0.52)	(0.25)
=1 for feeling like an active member of society	0.56	242	0.45	0.65	0.20**	0.57	0.01
	(0.50)		(0.50)	(0.48)	(0.06)	(0.50)	(0.08)
=1 for ambition to participate more actively in society	0.78	240	0.82	0.75	-0.07	0.70	-0.10
	(0.42)		(0.39)	(0.44)	(0.05)	(0.46)	(0.07)
=1 for agreeing 'not enough public spaces' is barrier for active participation	0.67	199	0.66	0.69	0.03	0.72	0.06
	(0.47)		(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.07)	(0.45)	(0.09)
=1 for agreeing 'I don't know possibilities/initiatives' is barrier	0.66	196	0.67	0.66	-0.01	0.76	0.12
	(0.47)		(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.07)	(0.43)	(0.09)
=1 for agreeing 'available activities are too far away' is barrier for active participation	0.53	193	0.42	0.65	0.22**	0.55	0.01
	(0.50)		(0.50)	(0.48)	(0.07)	(0.51)	(0.10)
=1 for agreeing 'Concerns for my personal safety' is barrier for active participation	0.32	194	0.30	0.35	0.04	0.34	0.02
	(0.47)		(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.07)	(0.48)	(0.09)
Time taken to fill survey in minutes	8.37	444	10.47	7.23	-3.24**	7.50	-1.17
	(11.17)		(15.34)	(7.87)	(1.10)	(10.17)	(1.21)

Appendix 3 Survey instrument

SPONSORED BY : Universität Göttingen - QuestionPro University Site License

Survey: Social Inclusion of Youth in Jordan - Email link

Survey on social inclusion in Jordan

Welcome to Göttingen University Social Inclusion Survey! Thank you for taking the time to take part in our survey.

Kindly be assured that all responses you provide will be kept in the strictest confidentiality. Your answers will be anonymous and cannot be linked to you personally.

If there are questions that you do not wish to answer, you can simply move to the next question in almost all cases.

If you require additional information or have any questions about our research study, don't hesitate to contact us (if possible in English): socialinclusion2017@uni-goettingen.de.

Thank you very much for your kind cooperation and please share the survey among your friends and colleagues!

About your background and life:

How old are you? *

Where were you born? *

- ☐ Jordan
- ☐ Syria
- ☐ Iraq
- ☐ Palestine
- ☐ Saudi Arabia
- ☐ Other country

For how long are you living in Jordan? *

- ☐ Less than a year
- ☐ More than 1 year and less than 2 years
- ☐ More than 2 years and less than 5 years
- ☐ More than 5 years
- ☐ I am not currently living in Jordan

For how long are you living in your current place of residence? *

- ☐ Less than a year
- ☐ More than 1 year and less than 2 years
- ☐ More than 2 years and less than 5 years
- ☐ More than 5 years

About your economic situation:

Do you currently have a job or attend school/university?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

Do you have a work permit?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

In my local community, there are enough job opportunities.

☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Agree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree ☐ Don't know ☐ I prefer not to answer

How do you rate your own living conditions compared to most other people in your local community?

☐ Much better ☐ Better ☐ Same ☐ Worse ☐ Much worse ☐ Don't know ☐ I prefer not to answer

How often do you use the following devices to communicate with others?

	On a daily basis	At least once a week but not daily	Fewer than once a week	I prefer not to answer
Phone (direct call or text)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Internet (e.g. Skype, Viber, Facebook)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

About your community life:

I feel a sense of belonging to the local community. [Where you currently live.]

☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Agree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree ☐ Don't know ☐ I prefer not to answer

Compared to two years ago: Do you feel a stronger or a weaker sense of belonging to the local community? [Where you currently live.]

☐ Stronger ☐ Same ☐ Weaker ☐ Don't know ☐ I prefer not to answer

Compared to when you first arrived in this community: Do you feel a stronger or weaker sense of belonging to the local community? (Where you currently live)

☐ Stronger ☐ Same ☐ Weaker ☐ Don't know ☐ I prefer not to answer

To which of the following groups do you feel the strongest sense of belonging?
Please rank the three most important groups (1=most important, 2= second most important, 3= third most important). *

Family

People who live in my neighbourhood

People of the same age

People with similar interest in sport, music, etc.

People of the same ethnicity

People of the same tribe

People who speak the same language

People of same country of origin

People of same country of residence

People with the same religious beliefs

Drag your choices here to rank them

Choose exactly 3 choices to rank them

Do you belong to the majority group in your local community?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

In general, I trust ...

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	I prefer not to answer
my close relatives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
my friends	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
my neighbours	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
people I don't know	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jordanians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Syrians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
other Non-Jordanians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Compared to two years ago: How has your trust changed in ... ?

	More trust	Same level	Less trust	Don't know	I prefer not to answer
People you know	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
People you don't know	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jordanians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Syrians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other Non-Jordanians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Compared to when you first arrived in Jordan: How has your trust changed in ... ?

	More trust	Same level	Less trust	Don't know	I prefer not to answer
People you know	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
People you don't know	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jordanians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Syrian	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other Non-Jordanians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Do you have friends who are of different nationality and who you would rely on for help?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

Over the past twelve months, have you helped someone you didn't know?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

Since you arrived in Jordan, have you helped someone you didn't know?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

Over the past twelve months, have you worked jointly with others to solve a problem in your local community?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

Since you arrived in your local community: Have you worked jointly with others to solve a problem in your local community?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

I feel like an active member of the society I am currently living in.

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

Would you like to participate more actively in the society you are currently living in?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know

☐ I prefer not to answer

Do the following factors hinder your active participation in society?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	I prefer not to answer
There are not enough public places to interact with others (e.g. youth centres).	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I don't know about possibilities to actively participate in society (e.g. are there existing programs/ initiatives?).	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Available activities are too far away.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Concerns for my personal safety restrict my movements in my local community.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

There are just a few questions remaining:

What is your gender?

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

In which region do you currently live?

- ☐ Irbid
- ☐ Ajloun
- ☐ Jerash
- ☐ Mafraq
- ☐ Balqa
- ☐ Amman
- ☐ Zarqa
- ☐ Madaba
- ☐ Karak
- ☐ Tafilah
- ☐ Ma'an
- ☐ Aqaba
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

Are you living in an urban or rural area or in a refugee camp?

- ☐ Urban
- ☐ Rural
- ☐ Refugee camp
- ☐ I prefer not to answer

One final question:

Filler text

[Instructions - Mode - Randomly Choose One]

Some scholars say that a sense of togetherness helps keeping a society united and peaceful.

In your opinion, how does a local environment look like that supports a sense of togetherness among people living in the local community?

Some scholars say that a sense of togetherness helps keeping a society united and peaceful.

How would you like to support a sense of togetherness among people living in your local community?

